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Abstract. The study of sequential decision processes has been important for theories of
statistical decisionmaking, dynamic programming, optimal stopping, search, and invest-
ment decisions. These literatures have emphasized the benefits of incrementalism and the
resulting value of information. However, the costs arising from asymmetries in access to
newly-arriving information have been uniformly ignored. This paper presents a prelimi-
nary inquiry into the costs of information in sequential economic decisionmaking problems.
An investment project with several stages is modeled, in which the project manager and
the investors have differential access to new information about project value. An optimal
contract is derived specifying financing terms and project management rules. Two general
conclusions are developed: first, asymmetric information in sequential decision problems
can be quite costly; second, modeling investment decisions as sequential problems with
asymmetric information can lead to optimal contracts that are simple, robust and realis-
tic. Applications to a broad range of economic questions are suggested.
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This paper presents a preliminary inquiry into a rather broad question: what are the costs
of information in a sequential decision-making problem? A rapidly growing economic liter-
ature emphasizes the benefits of sequential decision-making, but ignores the costs. Making
decisions incrementally allows parties to use newly-arriving information, but interested
parties are likely to have differential access to new information. Thus, spreading decisions
over time creates opportunities to exploit informational asymmetries. Dynamic asymmet-
ric information generates costs.
The study of sequential decision processes was largely initiated in the statistical decision
literature, by Wald [1947]. This field flourished during the 1950s and 1960s, including in
particular Bellman's work on dynamic programming (1957] and the extensive work on
optimal stopping rules (e.g., Chow et al. [1971]). Interest in sequential decision problems
has been growing in the economics literature, particularly for search theory and investment
modeling applications.'
The various literatures on sequential decision problems have uniformly ignored infor-
mational asymmetries between different interested parties.2 Since the essence of sequential
Thanks to Jim Dana, Rob Gertner, Bob Gibbons, Oliver Hart, Jerry Hausman, Stew Myers, Bob
Pindyck, Jim Poterba, Mark Prell, David Scharfstein, members of the MIT Theory Workshop, and espe-
cially Jean Tirole for helpful discussion and suggestions. Financial support was received from the National
Science Foundation and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.
I Sequential decision search theory papers typically model search for a good price, be it for a con-
sumer good or a labor contract (..g., Rothschild [1974]; Morgan and Manning (1985]; Morgan [1985]).
Sequential-decision investment applications emphasise high-risk projects, such as research and devel-
opment or large projects with long lead times (e&g., Weitsman [1979); Roberts and Weitsman [1981];
Weitsman, Newey and Rabin [1981]; Bernanke [1983]; Reinganum [1983]; MacDonald and Siegel [1983];
Majd and Pindyck (1985]).
2 One recent exception is Tirole [1986], who studies procurement contracts.
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decisionmaking problems is the value of information, the possibility of asymmetric infor-
mation costs is fundamental to a complete analysis.
In economic contexts, it seems as natural to presume that there will be informational
asymmetries as that there will not. For example, a typical investment project will involve
the interests of managers and investors. Wage contracting in a labor search model depends
on the differential information available to workers and firms. In general, any firm activity
which uses dynamically changing information will be affected by asymmetries between the
parties to the firm's "nexus of contracts": employees, managers, shareholders, creditors,
regulators, etc. Thus, the results below are applicable to such varied problems as the role
of the bankruptcy mechanism and the costs of external financing (such as debt or limited
partnerships); the design of optimal patent policy; and the decision to close a factory.
Our purpose is to investigate optimal decision rules in a sequential decision problem
when information is obtained asymmetrically. The effect of asynunetries on the value of
information is of special interest.
We model a prototypical investment problem, which captures the central characteristics
of much of the economics literature cited above. Following Roberts and Weitzman [19811,
the problem will be called a sequential development project (SDP). The project takes T
periods to develop before it produces any revenues, and requires investment of It during
period t of development. The value of the project is uncertain, but as each development
stage is completed, new information about project value is obtained. At each stage, the
decision-maker can choose to continue or abandon the project.
This framework is relatively general, yet simple enough to accommodate an intuitive
understanding of the optimal decision problem in a dynamic stochastic setting with asym-
metric information. Some generalizations and applications are discussed at the end.
Previous studies of SDPshave assumed that a project's investors and manager are the
same economic actor. In fact, often the financing and management of an SDPare separated.
When more than one actor has an interest in project outcomes, conflicts of interest can
arise. Such conflicts are common in reality.3 Analyses of SDPswhich ignore informational
* So common that limited partnership prospectuses are required by law to have a section detailing
possible conflicts. Much of the modern finance literature distinguishes between securities as contracts
which specify different asymmetries of information and control.
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asymmetries exaggerate the beneficial value of information. Existing and proposed policies
which subsidize or otherwise encourage decision schemes involving interest conflicts may
be costly and ineffective.
Two general conclusions are developed below. First, the agency problem in sequen-
tial decision problems may be quite severe, leading to high efficiency costs. This result
indicates the need to consider asymmetric information when evaluating SDPs. Second,
the characteristics of an SDP, when put into a dynamic principal-agent model, generate
theoretically optimal contracts which are simple, robust and realistic. An emerging view
in the principal-agent literature holds that theoretically optimal contracts are often unre-
alistically complex and nonrobust.' The optimal decision contract derived below bears a
striking resemblance to contracts actually observed for financing at least some SDPs. This
result follows from restricting the dynamic problem to one of incentives provision, without
insurance characteristics. The implications are wide-ranging. For instance, the analysis
suggests reasons for the existence of a bankruptcy mechanism, rather than more complex
schemes for the transfer of organizational control and resources.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a description of the SDP. Descrip-
tions of the full-information solution, and of a static (one-period) asymmetric information
solution are presented as benchmarks for comparison with the dynamic second-best con-
tract. The SDP contracting problem is formally treated in Section 3. The results are
summarized in Section 4, which then discusses implications and presents a numerical ex-
ample. Section 5 considers generalizations and other applications of the model; Section 6
concludes.
2. A Model of Sequential Decision Making
This section presents a formal model of the sequential development problem with asym-
metric information, and discusses the solution of the problem in two special cases: a
two-decision model with full information, and a one-decision model with asymmetric in-
formation. These two cases will be referred to as the first-best and static contracts. The
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Figure 1. Timing of the Sequential Development Project
next section derives the solution to the multiple-decision problem with asymmetric infor-
mation.
The problem will be specifically stated for a two-decision, three-period problem. Section
3 first solves the contract for the two-decision case. The model is then generalized to T
periods.
Timing
At time to, the investor and the firm meet to sign a contract, which specifies the terms
according to which the firm will undertake a risky development project requiring a to-
tal investment of I dollars (see Figure 1) .a No revenues arereceived until the project is
completed.6 The investor puts up Io dollars (Io < I) to fund the development effort during
the first period, t E [0,11. A contract's observable terms are legally enforceable at zero
cost for the duration of the game.
6 We will refer to the parties as a firm and an investor to lend concreteness to the discussion. However,
the model is generally applicable to any type of principal and agent relationship.
6 This assumption is made to emphasize the nature of development projects, consistent with the existing
literature, but is not necessary for the contract results below. See Section 5.
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At time t1 , the firm privately receives some information S1 . (The information structure
is detailed below.) The firm then decides whether to continue or stop project development
(D 1 = 1,0 respectively). If stopped, the project is abandoned forever.
7 The investor
knows whether the firm abandons development. The firm can announce S1, a public
message concerning its private information. Contracted payments, P1 (S1 , D1), can be
made between the parties at 1. The courts can enforce contract terms which are functions
of common knowledge (the message and the continuation decision), but the courts have
no access to private information (such as the truthfulness of the message).
We can think of the newly-arriving information as being observable by both parties, but
not verifiable by the courts. The important thing is that contracts can only be contingent
on messages, or public claims about the information, not the information itself. Messages
are important because the problem is dynamic: future payments can be contingent on past
payments, which can deter the firm from making frivolous or empty announcements.
If the firm continues development, the investor now (t 1) puts up the remaining invest-
ment, I,. At time t2 , the project development is completed. The firm receives another
private signal, S2, and decides whether to complete or abandon (D 2 = 1,0). Another
message can be sent to the investor; both message and continuation are again common
knowledge. Time t 2 is the end of the sequential investment game, so the parties make the
final contracted payments (which can depend on all past and present common knowledge).
If the firm completes the project it receives the present (t2 ) value of the project.
Information
There is a one-dimensional signal generated by a stochastic process, St E [0, St].a The
cumulative distribution of St conditional on all prior realizatjqns (denoted by S.,) is given
by F(S, | S-.). Generalized density functions* are assumed to exist, dF(S, I S...) =
7 In a similar problem, but without asymmetric inforrnation, Majd and Pindyck [1985] evaluate a project
for which development can be both stopped and restarted. We leave this generalisation of our results
to further research.
' All of the results go through for any general lower bound, L, on the support of St. Working with
zero merely simplifies the description of the first-best project management.
*See DeGroot [1970].
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f(St I S..)dSt. Higher values of St represent "good news" about the distribution of S+ 1 ,
in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance:
Assumption (FSD). f U(St)dF(S | ISt-1, St-2,...,So) > f U(St)dF(SI |S|-1,
St-2, ... , So)VS ,VSt-1 > Si-1,VS-(t_), for nondecreasing functions U(Q).
We also make an assumption on the hazard rate for the conditional distribution:
Assumption (DHR). The hazard rate of St is decreasing; i.e,
-- (H_(Sa{S- )) a- 1-F(StIS )<0
aSt 88 f (St I St)
This assumption is common in the incentives literature, and is true for many distributions
(e.g., normal and lognormal). The condition needed below is actually weaker than (DHR);
the role of the assumption will be highlighted when it is used.
The last signal, S2 in the two-decision problem, is identically equal to the value of the
project if completed (e.g., net revenues). So is known before contracts are signed at to. So
and F(. jI-) are common knowledge.
The information structure can be thought of in the following way. At to, both par-
ties have equal access to what is known about the project, say through published patent
materials, or in the case of natural resource exploration, from public records of geological
surveys and production from adjacent fields.'0 However, after development is underway,
the firm obtains new information from its development work, such as updated estimates
of unit production cost. The investor can only learn of the development results through
messages (St) from the firm.
Given the timing and information structure above, the pi.yment notation in Figure 1
can be made clear. Stated in general for a many-period SDP, let $, = ($,, $,-1,..., S,
and likewise for D,, where D, represents the continue/abandon decision. The contract
can specify that at time T the firm will pay the investor an amount F,($,DT) which is a
function of the firm's messages, 57 E [0,S,] and the continuation decisions, D7 E {0, 1}.
'o The possibility of es anate asymmetries of information is discussed in Section 5, below.
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Preferences and Wealth
The firm is assumed to be risk neutral, to have limited liability, and to be able to lend
any wealth it accrues at its discount rate. The firm has zero wealth at time zero, and its
borrowing is observable (hence controllable) by the investor. Limited liability with risk
neutrality for the firm is often assumed as a tractable way of capturing managerial risk
aversion.I The investor has substantial wealth and no legal liability limit. The investor is
presumed to be risk neutral. Relaxation of the preferences is discussed in Section 5.
First-Best Solution
Suppose the investor has free access to the same information as the firm, and a free right
to undertake the project (i.e, the firm does not own the idea for the project). Then, the
investor could operate the project herself. (Alternatively, suppose the firm has sufficient
wealth to pay the development costs; no investor is needed.) At time t2 , all investment
costs are sunk; since S2 is bounded below by zero, the first-best decision is to complete any
project which reaches the t2 stage. Solving backwards for the ti decision, the choice is to
abandon for a zero return, or make the incremental investment I1 to continue development.
The optimal choice is to continue if and only if 6 E[S2 | Si] I,, where 6 is the discount
factor. That is, the project should be continued at t1 if the observed signal exceeds a
critical value, Si >S1B, where Sf1B satisfies the previous condition with equality. The
first-best decision rule is extremely simple for the two-decision SDP; for certain specifica-
tions, full-information rules can also be derived analytically in many-period problems.'2
To summarize, for a project which is commenced at time to, we have:'8
i" Limited liability is assumed to hold for each period; i.e, courts will not enforce contract terms which
make the agent's wealth go negative in some states of nature. Sappington [1983] has pointed out that
risk neutrality with limited liability is related to the more general model, in that limited liability will
be a necessary condition in equilibrium for optimal contracts if an agent is risk-neutral for outcomes
above the liability limit, L, but infinitely risk averse for outcomes below L.
L2 See, e.g., Roberts and Weitsman [1981]; Weitsman, Newey, and Rabin [1981]. See also the analytical
example in Section 4.
'5 We are suppressing the time to decision, which is to initiate the project if' So ;> Sjf E, where SfjP is
defined analogously to Sf B, and guarantees that the expected future discounted cash flows (conditional
on future optimal stopping) just cover the incremental investment I@.
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Full-Information Decision Rule for SDP. At t 1 , invest I1 and continue iff S1 > SfB,
where Sf B is a critical value, defined above. At t 2 , continue in all states.
Static Contract
Suppose that no new information is received until the end of the entire development period
(or that the investor acts as if the firm learns nothing until the end). After I dollars are
sunk, the firm observes the project value, 52; the investor observes only announcements
and whether or not the firm decides to abandon the developed project. Payments only
take place at the end of the project, after the continuation decision is observed.
In the next section we shall appeal to the Revelation Principle to justify restricting
contracts to those which induce the firm to truthfully report its private knowledge about
project value. Making that restriction here, it is clear that the payment from the firm to
the investor cannot depend in any way on the value of the project. Suppose payments
were contingent on the firm's announcement: then the firm would lie about S2 so as to
minimize its obligations to the investor. Since the game is over, and the investor never
directly observes 52, there is no way to detect or punish the firm for such a lie. Therefore,
the firm will only tell the truth as a matter of indifference; i.e, payments cannot depend
on the announced project value.
The optimal static contract specifies a fixed payment, X, which the firm makes if it
completes the project (and receives 52). Otherwise, the project is abandoned, and no
transfers occur (since the firm has limited liability, the investor cannot demand compen-
sation for her sunk investment costs). The firm's decision is to complete if S2 exceeds X,
or abandon otherwise. The firm's value at the final decision is max[S - X, 0]. An optimal
contract solves a constrained Pareto optimizing problem for X*.
The static contract distorts the final decision (in the first-best, the project is always
completed once all costs are sunk), and ignores any opportunity to make decisions incre-
mentally. That is, the static contract suffers from information asymmetries, but does not
capture the benefits of dynamic decision-making. The full-information dynamic contract
above benefits from incrementalism, but ignores the possibility of asymmetric information.
The remainder of this paper is concerned with problems which involve both sequential
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decision-making and asymmetric information. The next section undertakes the theoretical
analysis. The discussion resumes (with a summary of the theoretical results) in Section 4.
3. The Optimal Contract
In this section the optimal financing contract for a sequential investment project is formally
characterized. The optimal contracts literature typically solves static contract problems
in two stages: first characterizing the set of actions by the agent which a feasible contract
can implement, and then solving the principal's problem of optimizing over the set of
implementable actions." This approach will be generalized to the dynamic problem and
followed here.
We shall first analyze the problem when there are three periods: a contracting period,
and two development periods with one continuation decision and one completion decision.
Then the results are extended to a problem with any finite number of decisions."
The surprising result shown in the next section is the simplicity of the optimal financing
contract for this complicated dynamic problem. A feasible contract can both induce the
firm to truthfully report its private information and condition payments on all announce-
ments except the last one. However, an optimal contract will not use the firm's private
information. Rather, the optimal dynamic contract names a sequence of constant termi-
nation fees, P° (the investor pays the firm P° if the firm abandons the project at time r),
and a completion fee PT (paid by the firm to the investor if it completes the project at
time T). Whether the firm reports its information or not is a matter of indifference to the
investor.
Implementability
The solution of the game is considerably simplified by invoking a basic result from the
literature:
" See, e.g., Guesnerie and Laffont [1984]. A related two-stage approach is taken in the "hdden action"
literature; see, e.g., Grossman and Hart [1983]..
16 This approach is followed because there are few results on dynamic principal-agent contracts in the
literature; therefore, a clear presentation of the results requires a careful formail development. The
formal proofs are simpler and more intuitive in the two-decision problem than in the T-decision model.
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The Revelation Principle. Without loss of generality, the class of feasible contracts,
W ($, D) can be restricted to contracts in which the messages ent by a utility maximizing
firm are truthful reports of the signals observed (Si, S2)0.1
The revelation principle is exploiting the fact that everything is known by the investor/prin-
cipal except (Si, S2 ). A contract I is a game form mapping strategies to outcomes. Since
the firm/agent's objective is common knowledge, the agent's strategy mapping S(S) is
common knowledge for any game form. The truthtelling game merely relabels the strategies
from S to S.
Define:
D 1, if the project is continued at time t
0, otherwise.
We want to implement D1 (Si), D 2 (S1, S2).17 Without loss of generality, we restrict the
analysis to deterministic incentive schemes."s Denote the agent's utility from time t2 on
by
= -P 2  D +S2D2 ($1$2)
where carets (^) indicate announcements, and variables without carets indicate true values.
At time t 2 , the past is history, and past utility cannot directly affect time t2 decisions (i.e,
we shall solve the finite game by backwards recursion). To implement a time t 2 decision
which involves time t2 truthtelling (regardless of the time t1 message, $1) requires:
S2D2($1,S2 ) - P2 (D 2 ($ 1,s 2), 1, 2) > S2 D 2 ($ 1 , S) - p2 (D 2($ 1 , s),& 1 ,s) (1)
16 Informal Proof. The firm observes (S1 , S2 ) = S and reports (S1 (Si), $2 (S2)) = S to maximise utility.
Suppose a contract 19(A) is feasible. Offer a contract *($--(s)); i.e, if the particular message
$(S') = $', let the payoffs 9*(S') be identical to t($'). Then, if when the true state is (Si, SI) the
optimal choice for the firm under ' is to get the outcomes associated with (S&, .1), it follows that
given choice over the same array of outcomes, the same outcome will be optimal under V*, and that
outcome is available by reporting $1 = S', the true state. See Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin
[19791 for a more formal statement of the theorem and proof.
17 We will not be stuck with noncontingent payments as in the static contract described in Section 2. It
will become clear that because the problem is dynamic, it will be possible to construct an intertemporal
scheme which alternately punishes and rewards the firm in a way which makes truthtelling optimal.
18 That is, we do not contemplate schemes in which the agent announces 'N and the principal gives a
probability of continuing the project. Usually, if both parties are risk-neutral with respect to income,
random schemes are not optimal (see, e.g., Moore 1985). It can be shown in the present case that if
Dt E [0,1), an optimal contract will always specify either D, = 1 or De = 0. Jean Tirole pointed out
the possibility of random schemes to me.
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S'D 2(S1, S -) -P2 (D 2 ($1 ,SI),$ 1 ,Si) 2 SD 2 ($ 1 ,S2 ) - P2 (D 2 ($1,s2 ),$ 1 ,s2) (2)
for almost all S2 , S2 and almost all S1 such that D 1 (S1 ) = 1. Adding (1) and (2) yields
(52 - SZ) [D2($1, 52 ) D2 ($1, S')] 0
so D2 (S 1S2 ) must be nondecreasing in S2. This implies that an optimal contract can name
a critical value of S2 (which may be a function of $i), S ($ 1), such that if S2 is greater,
the project is completed, and is abandoned otherwise:
Proposition 1. A truthtelling second-period action, D 2 (S1, S2), is implementable only if
3 S($1) such that D2($1,$ 2) = 1 i 52  S.
Therefore, payments at time t2 (P2 ) must be independent of S2; otherwise, at t2 , given
D2 (S1, S2) = D2 (S1 , 52) (i.e, within the region of $2 Sz, for S2> Sz respectively), the
agent will lie about S2 so as to minimize its payments to the principal.
Now fold the game back to time t1, The agent's expected utility is
wi = -Pi (Di($ 1 ),$i) + 6Di(S1) E [W2 ( 1 ,s 2 ) I s1
where 6 is the one-period discount factor, and the expectation of w2 incorporates the
implementation of D 2(S1 , 52) and P2(D 2 , $1). To simplify notation, define
W (Si,$1) = E [w2 ($ 1 ,S 2 ) Si] = J[s2D2 ($1,s2 ) - P2 (D 2 (S1, s2 ),) 1f(S2| IS 1)dS2
(3)
Applying Proposition 1, it is clear that the integrand in (3) i& nondecreasing in S2 ; there-
fore, by first-order stochastic dominance (FSD), W(S1, $1) is strictly increasing in St.
To implement D1 (S1) we require
-P1 (D2 (S1 ),5Si) ± 6Di(Si)W(S1 , S1 ) -P1 (D1 (S), SI) + 5D1(SI)W(S1 , SI) (4)
-P1 (D1 (SI), SI) + 6D1 (SI)W(SI, SI) -- P1(D1(S1),5S))+ 6D1(SiW(Si, S) (5)
11
for almost all Si, S(. Adding (4) and (5) yields
Di(Si)[W(Si,Si) -W(s,Si) - Di(Si) W(S 1 ,Si) - W(SiSi) > 0 VS1 , Si (6)
Suppose S1 > S1; since W(-,.-) is increasing in its first argument, and D1 E {0,1}, imple-
mentability of D1 (Si) will require that D1 ($1) be nondecreasing. Thus, analogously to
Proposition 1, we obtain a critical value result for Si:
Proposition 2. A truthtelling first-period action, D1(S1), is implementable only if 3 Si
such that D1 (S 1 ) = 1 4 Si > Sj*.
To complete the characterization of implementability, it is necessary to consider the
choice of $1 to implement S; (Si) in a truthtelling equilibrium. Consider all Si, Si such
that D1(S1) = D1(Si) = 1. Then from (6) we require
[w(si,s1) - W(S, S)] -[w(s 1,si) - W(Si, S] > 0 (7)
Condition (7) states that to ensure truthtelling, the gain in expected time t2 utility
from telling the truth must be at least as great when the truth is good news as when
the truth is bad news (i.e, Si > Si). To investigate (7) first consider the definition of
SS($1) in Proposition 1: the project is continued at time t2 (i.e, D2 = 1) if S2 > S2. Let
P2 '($ 1 ) denote the payment P 2 (D 2($ 1,s2),&) when D 2 = 1; similarly define PO ($ 1 ).
That is, P' is the completion payment, and P2 the payment if the project is abandoned
at t2 . Then, an optimizing agent will continue at time t2 (i.e, choose D 2 = 1) if and
only if S2 - P2 > Ps, or S2 Pz - P2. Together with Proposition 1, this implies that
S($1) = P' - P°. Writing out time t2 utility gives
E[w2 | Si] = -P ($ 1)F (S(S1) | Si) +] [s2 - Ps(1S)J /(f2 |S 1 )dS2
s(si)
sa (8)
= -Pf($1) + j 3[2 - 5;*($1)] f(S2 I S1)dS2 (8
Then (7) can be rewritten as:
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(s2 - s(s1)] [f(s 2 I 51) - f(S 2 I sids 2
s;(si)
I-:(S[52 - s2(S) [f(s2 i1) -(S2 s ds 2 i) 0 (9)
1s;(si)1 
>0()
Now, integrate (9) by parts to get




J (S)[F(52 |1) -F(S 2 | Si)]dS2-{[F(S2I S 1 )-F(S2 | Si)J S2-S(SI) 
J F(S2 |S) -F(S 2 | Si)dS2 >0 (10)
But [F(52 I Si) - F(S2 I Si)] evaluated at the upper limit of S2's support, S2, equals zero,
as does [52 - S (S)] evaluated at S2 = S($1) for any S. Thus the first and third terms
of (10) are identically zero. If we then suppose Si > Si, [F(S2 I Si) - F(S 2 I Si)] < 0 by
(FSD), so implementability of S (Si) requires S2(S'1) nonincreasing in $1:
Proposition 3. Given the condition in Proposition 1, D2 (S1, S2 ) is implementable (equiv-
alently, S (S1) is implementable) only if S2($1) is nonincreasing.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is important for understanding the optimal sequential
investment contract: since news is monotonically better as S1 increases, the agent knows
the project is more likely to go through to completion the higher is S1. The agent thus has
a greater interest in lower net completion payments S if Sl is higher; truthful reporting
of Si will only occur if the contract reflects the agent's interest in decreasing S .
Propositions 1-3 establish the necessary conditions for a sequential investment financing
contract to be incentive-compatible. In general, it is feasible to induce truthful revelation
of the time t1 private information, S1, and to condition contract terms on the value of S1.
However, the next result will demonstrate that it is not optimal to do so; i.e, that Sj'(si) =
0 in an optimal contract (where "dots" over variables indicate time differentiation).
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The Principal's Optimization
Consider the principal's optimization problem:
max -Io + E {6P1(Di[S1],S 1 ) - 6I 1D 1 (S1 ) +6 2Di(Si)P2 (D 2 [S 1 ,S 2], S1 )} (11)
St,s-(SI) si,s2
i(1, if Si >Si
sot. D 1 =
10, otherwise
D 1, ifS 2 SZ
0, otherwise
S 0 almost everywhere (a.e.)
(The agent's individual rationality constraint is never binding because the agent always
chooses De to obtain the expected maximum of something and zero; therefore the agent's
expected utility must always be nonnegative.) Following the discussion leading to equation
(8), E[P 2 (D2 ,S1) | S1] can be written as P20(S1 ) + S (Si)[1 - F( Sill Thus, the
optimizing choice of the function S (Si) must maximize
E62Di(S1)S2*(Si) 1 - F(S(S1 ) I } s.t. 2 ; 0 a.e.
Defining the control variable y(S 1 ) = $ (Si), and the constraint p(Si) < 0, we can
write the Hamiltonian for this subsidiary problem
H = 62Di(Si)S;(Si){1 - F[S2(Si) j Sij}f(Si) -A(S)s(Si)
The necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimal y(S1) are:
-H=i(Si) =62Di(Si){1-F(S |Si)] - SF(S Si)}f(S1)
8H 0, ify>0
By= 0, ifsy < 0 (strictly)
(S)= A(0) = 0 (transversality)
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where sufficiency follows from the concavity (i.e, linearity) of H* in y.
Now we shall demonstrate that the optimal critical value of S (S1 ) is independent of
Si:"
Proposition 4. $S(S1) = 0 for all Si > S* (wlog for all Si).
Proof. Suppose S < 0 strictly for some interval Si E [a, b]. Then, by the complementary
slackness condition, A(S1) = 0 for S1 E [a, b], which implies A = 0 for S1 E [a, b]. If A = 0
then by the costate equation
f [S;(Si) I Si1]
Implicitly differentiating:
V Si E [a, b]
- a [ L[H(S*,1 S1)] 1 - F [S 2 S1
$2* =-- e where H (S2 , S, )
- H (S2, S1)] 1152|1 Si]
Since the hazard rate H(S2, S) is assumed to be decreasing in S2,
(12)
sgn(S) = sgn{ [I((2, Sl] }
The (FSD) condition implies
f(52 | Si) , f(52 | S')
f( 2 |IS1) f( 2ISD
(see Milgrom [1981]), so
Vs2 > S2, Si > S1
f3,>s, f(S 2  S1)dF(S2 I S1 ) f3,>s, f(S 2 I Si)dF(S2 I Si)
f(52|I si) f(32 SI)
which implies
1 - F(S 2I1S1) 1 - F(S2 I S1)
f(12 S1) f(S2 St)
so H(S 2 , Si) is increasing in S1, and A = 0 implies Si > 0. This result contradicts the
incentive-compatibility constraint however, so we conclude that i # 0 for any interval
Si E [a, b], which means A(S9) 6 0 on any interval, so y = $ = 0 for almost all S ;> Si
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by complementary slackness. For S1 < S1, Di(Si) = 0, so we can take S (Si) = Si = 0
for Si < S1 wlog.'* I
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. The higher is the truthful report
of S1 , the better is the posterior distribution of project value, S2 . Therefore, the in-
vestor/principal wishes to extract more rents when S1 is higher, requiring a higher S2 (the
net completion payment). This is similar to the monopoly pricing problem with unknown
reservation prices, or to the Ramsey pricing problem. To see the latter analogy, note that
in a first-best situation, the cutoff value of S2 would be zero (all investment costs are sunk).
Therefore, setting a net completion payment S; > 0 creates a distortion. However, the
higher is Si, the higher is S2 likely to be, so the principal wishes to minimize distortions
by extracting higher rents in those states of the world where the distortion is less likely to
be binding.
It is important to emphasize this result: it is feasible for a contract to exploit the firm's
private first-period information, and that information is valuable. The conflict between
what the investor wants to do with the information and what she can do with it yields a
severe inefficiency in SDPs with conflicts of interest.20
Implementation
If we do not assume that the agent has limited liability and begins with zero wealth, it
would be simple to show that the first-best allocation described in Section 2 could be
implemented. For example, the principal/investor could sell the project to the firm for its
time to expected value, and let the firm make all of the investments and decisions.2 '
19 Note that the (DHR) assumption was stronger than we need for thJ result; the proposition follows if
1 (8/8;) [H(S;, Si)] > 0, which is true if the hasard rate rises less rapidly than at rate unity. But
this condition to obtain a positive denominator in (12) is identical to the second-order condition for
an optimal S;(S,) for the problem in which 5; is unconstrained. Therefore, (DHR) is not a restrictive
condition.
20 It is not a general result in dynamic problems that contract payments cannot depend on messages
about new information. Allen [1985] presents a dynamic model with no actions--just information--in
which it is optimal to condition second-period payments on first-period messages. See the discussion
below, in Section 4.
21 Alternatively, with a different distribution of bargaining power at to, a contract could specify that
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With limited liability the first-best outcome is not implementable. However, the propo-
sitions above imply that the structure of the optimal contract is simple indeed. A second-
best contract which implements D1 = 1 a Si Si and D2 = 1 S2  S (given
Di = 1), is equivalent to a contract which specifies just two constant payments: a ter-
mination fee paid by the investor to the firm if the project is abandoned at t1 , and a
completion payment from the firm to the investor if the project is completed at t2 .
Proposition 5. The optimal contract can be implemented by naming two constant pay-
ments, P° < 0 and P2 > 0, where P is paid if D1 = 0, and P2 is paid if D2 = 1.
Proof. By Proposition 1, implementation of D2 requires that the firm have incentives to
complete the project if S2  Si. At time t2 , the firm in fact chooses to complete iff
S2 > P2 - P2. Set P2 = Sz and P2 = 0. If the firm reaches time t2 with nonnegative
wealth, these payments cannot violate limited liability in any state of the world.
By Proposition 2, an optimal implementation of D, requires that the firm continue the
project iff S > S*. At time t1, the firm continues if E[D2 (S2 - Sf) | S1J P1 - P0. By
(FSD), the left-hand side of the inequality is monotonically increasing in S1. Therefore,
set -PO = E[D2(S2 - SS) I Si] and P1 = 0. D2 (S2 - Si) is nonnegative everywhere, so
P° < 0. Therefore the firm has nonnegative wealth in all states of the world at ti.1
Finally, certain straightforward welfare comparisons can be made between the optimal
second-best dynamic contract, the first-best, and a static contract as described earlier.
Most of these results are simple and intuitive; formal proofs are omitted for brevity. Recall
that a static contract is one that ignores intermediate decisions and information, writing
terms only for the completion of the project.
Proposition 6. (Comparison of a dynamic contract to a static contract.)
(a) The value of a dynamic contract weakly dominates a static contract.
the principal would make the investments. The contract would then set S; = 0 by letting time ts
payments be sero. Recall that at time ti, the first-best decision is to continue if S1 > Sf Shr3f
is defined implicitly by E [52 |'~ S-] It. Thus, the firm would pay E [52 | Ss) to the investor
at it if the project were continued. The investor gets her expected reservation utility (sero) and the
firm collects all of the project rents. In either solution to the first-best, the agent/firm is the residual
claimant on the project.
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(b) A long-term (2-period) static contract is equivalent to repeated short-term con-
tracting (i.e, recontracting at the beginning of each period).
(c) If I1 > 0, there will be underinvestment under static contracts relative to dynamic
contracts; i.e, some projects for which dynamic contracting is feasible will not be com-
menced with static contracting.
Proposition 6(a) is true because a dynamic contract can duplicate a static contract by
setting S* = 0 and SZ appropriately; but Si $ 0 in general. The repeated short-term
contracts in part (b) work as follows: at time to, the parties write a contract specifying
time t1 payments. After the contract terms are fulfilled at t1 , a new contract is written
specifying time t2 payments. Since the agent has no wealth, he can't pay the principal
anything at ti. Since the agent has limited liability, he will always sign any new contract
offered at t1, so the principal need not pay the agent anything at ti. Then, at t 1 , since
there have been no payments or observable actions, the principal has no new information;
she will offer the agent the same t2 terms that she would have offered at to. The result is
identical to writing a contract at to for t2 which ignores the t, continuation decision (the
firm goes ahead in all states at t, under either static contract scheme).
Proposition 6(c) follows from showing that the dominance in part (a) is in fact strict
for projects with Ii > 0; projects with an expected value of zero to the principal under
dynamic contracting must have a negative value under static contracting, which violates
the investor's rationality constraint.
Similar arguments establish analogous comparisons between the asymmetric and full-
information dynamic contracts. We prove one further characteristic to highlight the inferi-
ority of second-best contracts: for projects that are commenged at to under either first or
second-best contracting, abandonment is inefficiently high under the second-best at both
ti and t2-
Proposition 7. (Comparison of a constrained dynamic contract to the first-best.)
(a) The value of a first-best dynamic contract strictly dominates a constrained ynamic
contract if I4 > 0; therefore some projects feasible in the first-best are infeasible in the
second-best (underinvestment).
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(b) Both continuation cutoffs are higher under the constrained ynamic contract (Si*>
SfD, Si > S2FB) so abandonment is inefficiently high at both decision points.
Proof. (Proposition 7(b)) See Appendix 1.E
Thus, with a second-best contract, some projects are abandoned at t, which would be
continued if financing were first-best; likewise at t2 .
Extending the Results to T Periods
The results on an optimal contract for financing sequential investment projects were de-
veloped above for a three-period problem (to, ti, t2 ); they can be extended to a general
T-period problem.22 We need only add an assumption that the signal process is Markov:
Markov Signal Assumption (MS). F(St I St-i, St-2, ..So) = F(St j St.. 1 ).
The reason the result goes through is quite simple. Incentive-compatible payments can
now be contingent on everything the firm has learned over several past decision periods
(not just Si), which provides more flexibility in designing reward-punishment schemes to
induce truthtelling. However, because signals are Markovian, the period t = r -1 signal is
a sufficient statistic for the expected value of the current t = r signal. In static principal-
agent problems it is well-known that incentive schemes based on sufficient statistics weakly
dominate those based on the underlying information.2 3 We generalize the sufficient statistic
result to a dynamic problem below, with the result that we can restrict consideration to
payment schemes which are based on only current and one-period-prior announcements.
Then, since the project life is finite, the game can be solved by backwards recursion.
At each stage of the recursion, because of the sufficient statistic result, the structure
of the problem is identical to the two-decision problem considered above. After defining
somewhat more general notation and establishing the sufficient statistic result, the optimal
22 Our notational convention specifies that problems have one more period (period 0) than abandonment
decision. However, we will casually refer to the general problem as having T periods or T decisions.
2s This is not what drives the result in Proposition 4. There is information useful at time t2 in signal Si;
the conflict between how the principal would use it and when the agent will truthfully reveal it makes
actual use of the information nonoptimal.
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contract results follow precisely as before. Proofs are somewhat tedious, however, and are
relegated to Appendix 1.
To facilitate symmetry of notation, assume that the final project value, if the project is
completed at time T, is ST+1 rather that ST.2 4 Then, denoting the agent's utility at time
t = r for the remainder of the game by w,., we can write the final period utility as
WT = -PT Dr( $. , + ($rDT(ST,$-) E [T+1($T,$T,ST+1) | ST
where wT+1 ST+1, and S..T {ST....1,T$S-2,-..., $1}. Applying Bellman's Optimality
Principle for dynamic programming, we can write period t = r utility as
w, = -P, (D,[$,, $...,], $r, $-...)+ 6D ,, $..,)E [wf+1($rT,.$-r,,+1) |Sr (13)
Proceeding recursively, it is possible to show that implementable abandonment/conti-
nuation decisions require critical values, St($-), as before:
Proposition 8. D (St, S..) is implementable only if B St ($-t) such that D ($,, $_,) =
1 * St St(-t).
The next step is to obtain conditions for the implementability of St (S-t). To do this, it
is helpful to establish the sufficiency of {St, St..} as a basis for payments Pt. Generalizing
Milgrom [1981J, define a sufficient statistic for the dynamic contracting problem as follows:
Definition. The function r (St, S-t) is called sufficient for {St, S-t} with respect to the
agent's decision Dt, if there exist functions ',(-) > 0, ht(-) > 0 such that
fA(S ,St...1l,...S1 | IDeD..) = 7t (r[s,s-Jj D) x h(S..I D...t)
for all S and D in the support of f (-).
Then, because St is Markovian, the following is true:
24 We could without loss of generality assurne that E [ST+L j Srl' =. ST and the problems would be
identical.
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Proposition 9. rt(St, S-e) {St, St. 1} is a sufficient statistic for {St, S-t} with respect
to the agent's decision Dt.
The notion of a sufficient statistic is that for any prior distribution on the agent's action
Dt, the posterior distribution of De given {St, S-.t} depends on the observed (truthfully
reported) values of {St, S-t} only through rt(S, S-.). Therefore, the principal gains
no additional control over the agent's action De by basing payments Pt on information
other than rt, or the current and prior value of the signal. This allows us to show that
without loss of generality we can restrict the contract to schemes in which payments Pt
are contingent only on St and St-.
Proposition 10. For the T-period SDP contract, 3 an appropriately chosen scheme
Pt (1T) which weakly dominates any scheme Pt(St, S-.), for t 1 ,... ,T.
The intuition behind Proposition 10 is that all of the statistical information about
current and future signals at time r is contained in T, = {Si, S,-}; conditioning time r
payments on anything other than r, adds extraneous noise. Using the (weak) risk aversion
of the agent, we can maintain the agent's expected utility while (weakly) increasing the
principal's expected utility by reducing the extraneous noise in the incentives scheme.
Now, to implement St S.. (e-1l, note that the continuation decision is given
by Dt = 1 iff 6DtE[wt+1 | S1J > Pt. Therefore, since S* is equivalent to implementable
Dt, we can consider only St($S..1). Proceeding as before, the necessary condition for
implementability of St(St-1) is
Proposition 11. St(St...1) is implementable only if St is nonincreasing in St..1.
The conditions for implementability of a given action vector D have now been extended
from the two-decision to the T-decision SDP. It is a straightforward matter to show, as
before, that the optimal scheme under limited liability can be implemented by a contract
which names a vector of constants:
Proposition 12. The optimal contract for the-T-period SDP is equivalent to one which
names a vector of constants (-Pf',...,-P%.._1; P#). The first T -1 values are the termi-
nation fees P9 for each period r = 1,... ,T - 1 respectively which the investor pays the
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agent if the project is abandoned at time r. The last value is the completion payment P j
from the firm to the investor if the project is completed at time T.
By generalizing to a T-decision SDP, a sequence of termination fees has been intro-
duced, rather than just one. As before, these fees should not be interpreted as payoffs
to the firm, but as incentives to ensure that the firm doesn't go ahead and spend the
investor's money if conditions have turned sour. In effect, the value of making a sequence
of incremental investment decisions rather than just a once-and-for-all investment comes
from the value of the option to abandon the project early. In the present case, when the
investor's and project manager's interests diverge, the investor offers the project manager
a share of the abandonment option value in an attempt to align their interests.
The abandonment option intuition is borne out neatly in two results we can prove
which characterize the termination fee sequence {P°} First, we know that because of
limited liability, the abandonment payments must be nonpositive, P° ; 0. In fact, if we
assume that St = 0 is an absorbing state of the Markov process (i.e, Pr[S, = 0 | St = 0] =
1 V r > t), then, when a period's investment is nonzero, the terminationfee is strictly
negative:
Proposition 13. If It > 0 and St = 0 is an absorbing state of the Markov sequence {St},
then P <0 Vt <T.
The simple intuition for Proposition 13 is that as long as 1, > 0, there is some abandonment
option value at time r, and the investor is better off sharing that value with the firm than
not (if P,9 = 0, the investor would go ahead at time r in all states of the world).
Even more importantly, we can establish that the termination fee sequence is nonin-
creasing. Formally,
Proposition 14. -Pf > -P9f 1 V t = 1, ... , T.
This result also accords with the abandonment option value notion: the greater the re-
maining number of stages in the project, the greater the remaining investment. Therefore,
the opportunity cost of continuing a bad project at time r is greater than at time r + 1;
the investor accordingly wants to give the firm a largerincentive to abandon at time T.
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4. Discussion and Example
In this section we summarize the results characterizing the optimal principal-agent con-
tracts for sequential investment projects. Then, following a brief discussion of the results,
we shall present a numerical example for a three-period problem. The example suggests
the relative importance of agency costs in evaluating SDPs, and is useful for discussing the
comparative statics of the problem.
Summaryi
We have examined a prototypical SDP: a development project which will take T periods
to develop before it produces any revenues, and which requires development expenditures
of It each period before completion. The theoretical analysis of the previous section yields
the following description of the optimal contract between investor and firm for an SDP:
Optimal SDP Contract. The investor pays Io, the development investment for the
period between to and t1. At t1, after obtaining information from the first development
stage, the firm decides whether or not to continue the project. If the firm abandons, the
investor pays a fixed termination fee to the firm, P10. If the firm continues, the investor
pays I1, the development cost for the next stage. The sequence is repeated at each t, with
the firm facing the choice to abandon and take P0 or to continue. If the project passes the
final development stage, at time T, the firm can abandon and receive nothing; or continue,
receiving the (certain) project value and paying the investor a flat completion fee,Pj.
Therefore, given the investment sequence {It}, the optimal contract is completely spec-
ified by the payment sequence {-P,; P } (for t = 1,..., T -1). From the firm's point of
view, after the contract is signed the SDP proceeds precisely as it does in models which
ignore agency problems; the opportunity cost of each development stage, however, is the
foregone termination fee. It is straightforward to analyze the behavior of the firm, and to
perform comparative statics on that behavior, after the contract is signed.26
In our simple model, the conflicts of interest change not the qualitative description of
project management, but rather the efficiency of the investment decisions in such projects.
2&5Se, e.g., Roberts and Weitsman [1981] for such an exercise.
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It was shown in the previous section that the firm will abandon a project in more states of
the world at any development stage under a dynamic contract than it would if financing
were first-best. Since the identical project is less likely to be completed under a dynamic
contract than in the first-best, it is clear that some projects will not even be started with
external financing which should be initiated according to a social efficiency criterion. It
was also shown that for a project which is initiated, expected abandonment at each stage
is inefficiently high. Thus, a world with external financing will have inefficiently low levels
of investment in risky development projects.
The emphasis on the value of sequential decision-making in the existing literature is
exaggerated if asymmetric access to information is present, because much of the informa-
tion made available by sequential decision-making is not used efficiently in optimal project
management. In principle, the contract can induce the firm's manager to truthfully reveal
his private information, and to condition payments on that information. A fundamental
conflict prevents this, however. The better is the first-period signal, the more likely is
the firm to ultimately complete the project. Thus, to induce the manager to truthfully
reveal S1 , he must be offered a lower payment schedule for t2 ; since he knows he's more
likely to complete, he has a greater interest in lower payments. On the other hand, the
investor/principal wants to extract maximal rents from the project, by minimizing dis-
tortions in the final decision. In the first-best, a project which reaches the final decision
is always completed. Like a Ramsey-price setter, the principal wants to extract higher
completion payments when S2 is likely to be high, because that is less likely to distort the
completion decision. S2 is likely to be higher when Si is higher, so the principal wants
higher payments when Si is high. These two interests directly conflict; the result is that
payments (and actions) are conditioned on the wrong cutoff signal.
Implications~ for Contract ComplezityJ
It has been considered a general result in the literature that optimal contracts use all of the
information available. In contrast, we have developed a general model in which contracting
parties can do better by essentially ignoring some information; the outcome is a simple
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and intuitive contract.26
The crucial assumption is that of the agent's risk neutrality.27 With risk-neutral agents,
the problem between principal and agent is one of providing only incentives, rather than
both incentives and insurance, or risk-sharing. By contrast, Allen [1985] presents a model
of pure risk-sharing (there are no actions whatsoever, and hence, no incentives problems),
which yields dynamic contracts which are complex and difficult to implement (i.e, second-
period payments are a continuous function of truthful announcements of the first-period
signal).
When the contracting problem is one of dynamic incentives provision, the complex-
ity of the contract is determined not by the complexity of the stochastic state space (a
continuously-distributed signal process in this case) and the associated message game, but
by the specification of the verifiable action space. In the present model, the action space
is quite simple - a stop-go decision is made at each juncture - and the optimal contract
is correspondingly simple (a single decision payment at each node).
The implications of these results for more general dynamic agency problems depend
on what we think is important about individual contracting relationships - insurance
or incentives - and what we think the complexity of the verifiable action space is. If we
think principal-agent contracts are a setting for behavioral incentives, and that insurance is
obtained elsewhere (e.g., in futures markets), then the first condition for simple contracts
is met. If we believe that full contingency specification in contracts is expensive, and
that the unwillingness of courts to second-guess "reasonable business judgment" reduces
the verifiability of more than a few, clearly-defined actions, then the second condition
might be met, and our theoretical model might appropriately be interpreted as a general
statement about the relative simplicity of actual contracts.
Numerical Example
We have constructed a numerical example of a three-period SDP managed under an optimal
contract. The example illustrates several of the points discussed above. First, the contract
26 Guesnerie and Laffont [1984] obtain a similar simplification in their example of a labor-managed firm,
but their result follows from an unusual objective function.
27 As mentioned earlier, the principal's risk aversion is inessential to the results.
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specification is simple. As a result, the value of the contract to each party has a intuitive
interpretation in terms of familiar notions from financial options theory. Second, the
efficiency costs of external financing are illustrated, and prove to be quite dramatic. It
turns out that in the example below, investment will not take place for projects which, in
a first-best setting, yield a 60% expected excess rate of return. Third, comparative statics
exercises are straightforward, and indicate the sensitivity of the efficiency costs to different
parameters of the problem.
Suppose that the signal St is generated by a Wiener diffusion process, dSt = aSdt +
a2Sdz; a and a constant imply St is distributed lognormally.2 8 Denoting the termination
fee by X 1, the completion fee by X 2 , and the rate of time preference by r, it can be shown
that the ex ante expected value of the contract to the firm is given bye
W2(-) = Soe-" 2$ 2 (h 2 , k2 ; p) - X 2 e-nr2a 2 (hIi,ki;p) + Xie-rr [1 - 4t(h 1)J (14)
where; is the length of time from contract signing until the completion of stage i (r1 = 1,
r2 = 2 in the theoretical presentation earlier); 02(-, -; p) is the bivariate standard normal
c.d.f. with correlation coefficient p; and t(-) is the univariate normal c.d.f., with
28 See, e.g., Merton (1973], or Chow [1981].
29 The derivation was presented in the earlier version of this paper, but involves the evaluation of double
integrals, and is now ornitted for brevity. Details available from the author on request.
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Alternatively, we can write equation (14) as
W2(-) = C2 (So,T1,T2, X1 ,X 2) + Xie-a (15)
where C2 (.) is a function known in finance theory which gives the value of a compound call
option. That is, C2 (-) represents the value of an option held at to to buy another option
at t 1 for price X1. The second option is the right to pay X 2 at t2 to obtain an asset worth
Sz-3°
Equation (15) is a convenient way to view the firm's problem. At To, the firm is
guaranteed X 1 exp[-rri] (it can costlessly quit at ri and receive the termination payment).
At a price of X4 (giving up the termination fee) it can exercise its option to "stay in the
game" at rl. If the firm continues the project, then, at a price of X2 (the payment to the
investor), it can obtain the value of the project at r2 (52) .
30 See Geske [1979] on the theory of conipound options. The function C2 (-) i.s "mispriced" because it is
not valued "as if' the expected return on S. were r instead of a. The mispricing occurs here because S.
cannot be freely traded-the current value of S. is private information--so arbitrage cannot force the
contingent daim price to reflect a risk-free equilibrium rate of return. This discussion is not essential
for what follows in the paper. For more on the theory of contingent claim pricing and "mispriced"
claims, see Merton [1973], Cax and Ross (1976], and Constantinids [1978].
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The value of the project to the investor is also easy to interpret. Let 3 be the fraction
of the total investment I which is spent during the second stage (131 = pi). Then the value
to the investor is given by:
V2 (-)= e~" 2 X 2 ' 2 (hi, ki; p) - e~"T IXi [1 - 4(h1 )] - r{1 - 3 -[ - e~" T'(hi)]} (16)
V(.) is the present value of the completion payment, X 2 , discounted by the probability
that the project won't be completed; less the present value of the termination fee discounted
by the probability that the project won't be abandoned at ri; less the present value of the
investment costs discounted for the probability that the project is abandoned before 131 is
spent.
The total value of the project in the first-best is given by
V* = Soe@T I(m 2 ) -1 {1 - [1 - errl(mi)]}
where:
In(So/B) +r -gy - zT-
m2 =m1 + /jfi~
The solution to the optimal contract problem can be obtained numerically given values for
the exogenous parameters (So, I,13, r, 1 , r2, a, a). For the examples below and in Appendix
2, we let So = 100, and varied the other parameters.A Suppose the total undiscounted
investment cost is I = 60, and that 50% must be paid at both t = 0 and r1 . Let r1 = 1,
r2 = 2. Let the real risk-free rate of return be r = 0.02, and the expected rate of gross
capital gain on the project be a = 0.03.
For these values, an optimal contract will specify that the investor pay the firm a
termination fee of XC1 = 3.98 if the firm abandons the project at t1 . This fee is 13% of the
31 For these examples, we made the arbitrary assumption that the capital market conditions and own-
ership rights to develop the project are such that the firm maximizes its project value, subject to the
investor receiving a reservation expected utility of V0 = 0 (i e, there is an infinitely elastic supply of
risk-neutral capital).
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second-period investment cost, which the investor would save if the firm terminated the
project. The firm agrees to pay the investor X2 = 65.7 at r2 if the project is completed.
We define the efficiency cost of asymmetric information as the loss in total surplus, or
V* - (W2 + V2). In this example, the value of the project (W2 - V2) is 39.3. Under full
information, the project is worth V* = 42.6, so the efficiency cost of the agency problem
is 3.3, which is nearly 8% of the first best project value. An efficiency cost of 8% might be
significant, and as is shown in Appendix 2, the efficiency loss increases rapidly under only
slightly less favorable project conditions. Projects with first-best excess returns of 60%
may not even be feasible in the second-best.
We have also evaluated the described project with asymmetric and full information
under the assumption that there is no sequential decisionmaking opportunity; 1.e, the
investment costs are still spread over time, but once undertaken, a project continues until
the final decision at time r2. (Under asymmetric information, this yields the static contract
discussed in Section 2.) With no sequential decision making, the second-best project value
falls to 36.4; however, the first-best value is still 42.6.32
Recent papers have argued that the opportunity to spread operating decisions over
the life of a project can substantially increase the value of the project.8 8 In the SDP, the
increase in project value is due to the opportunity to stop a project if the environment
turns sour before all of the investment funds are committed. However, the increase in full-
information project value due to the benefits of sequential decision making is essentially
nil in this example. The project is very attractive in a full-information world: for a present
value investment of about 59, the firm can undertake a project with an expected present
value of about 101 (recall that a > r). The SDP will almost surely be completed even
with an early abandonment option.
On the other hand, while sequential decision-making is rather unimportant in a full-
information world for the example project, the introduction of asymmetric information is
quite significant. The efficiency cost of asymmetric information is 8% of first-best value
32 To three significant digits. In fact, the no-sequential-decision first-best is slightly less than V*.
sa See Majd and Pindyck [1985], Roberts and Weitaman [1981].
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in the sequential decision case, and 14.5% in the no-sequence case. Previous papers which
ignore asymmetric information report the benefits of sequential decision making without
considering the costs.
The comparative statics of asymmetric information costs in this example are discussed
in Appendix 2.
5. Extensions
Some generalizations of the model have been considered in MacKie-Mason [1986]. For
example, all of the results go through if the firm has some wealth to invest in the project,
as long as that wealth is less than the total investment cost. Whatever wealth is available
will be invested." Also, the results hold if revenues are received before completion of
the decision sequence. The only difference is that the contract also specifies a sequence of
continuation payments, in order to transfer part of the revenues to the investor. In another
direction, adding ex ante asymmetric information leads to a standard "lemons" problem:
some "bad" firms will offer fraudulent projects, which leads to an equilibrium with even
great investment inefficiency.
Other Applications
The SDP is similar to other long-term dynamic economic problems which may involve
divergent interests. Long-term debt and patent policy were mentioned at the beginning
of the paper. The former is essentially the SDP with revenues flowing in during the
investment period as discussed above. It might be interesting to generalize even further
for the long-term debt problem. Suppose the lender could observe the private firm's
information directly, but at substantial cost (say, by writing into the contract a provision
allowing the bank to place representatives inside the firm). Suppose further that if the
lender forecloses on the debt, the project/firm is not worthless; i.e, it has salvage value
(though less than if the present management had been allowed to continue).A5
" This has been called "maxirnurn equity participation" in the one-period bankruptcy model of Gale
and Heliwig [1985].
* What we are describing is essentially the same as the model in Gale and Heliwig [1985] but extended
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In the situation described, the lender may not want to set a stream of fixed payments
which the firm must pay or face automatic liquidation. Instead, the lender may be willing
to let the firm default, but let the firm continue in operation with the lender observing
full information. Then, if conditions improve, the firm can buy its way back into an
arm's-length debt contract, but only on terms less favorable for the remaining periods
than the original contract. The foregoing is a rough description of long-term loans with
restrictive covenants and bank intervention of the sort observed in reality, and intuition
suggests that such a contract might emerge as optimal from the model in this present
paper. Alternatively, the model could be interpreted as a theory of bankruptcy which
allows for both liquidation and reorganization.
In the case of patent policy, there is a striking resemblance between the contracts em-
bodied in European patent policies and the model developed in this paper. Consider the
European patent with renewal fees. The firm is developing a project with a sequential
option to abandon. Each year it must pay the renewal fee to stay in the game. The
government receives a series of payments, unless the firm lets the patent lapse. In some
countries, there are no renewal fees, but a firm must "work" a patent to retain exclusive
rights. "Working" may require a sequence of investments. The government wants to opti-
mize some objective function by choosing renewal fees or minimum "working" expenditures
subject to self-interested behavior by the firm.
The model is directly applicable to analysis of a firm's decision on when to close a
factory, or to exit an industry altogether.s" The firm's manager faces a sequence of decisions
of when to optimally close the factory or the firm, based on newly-arriving information. 7
Interests are likely to diverge between manager and owners, especially when managers
have substantial human capital invested in the firm, the rents on which are not residually
beyond a single-period, static contract problem to consider the dynamics of inforrnation and decision-
making. Aghion and Bolton [1986] have presented a model of long-term debt which is one example of
the general problem developed in this paper.
3* Schary [1986] studies the role of abandonment option value without infbrmational asymmetries in
declining industries with application to the cotton spinning industry.
av Recall that the model generalises to the case where revenues are received in every period; see MacKie-
Mason [1986].
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claimed by the shareholders. Severance payments (or, eg., relocation assistance) are a
natural prediction in this case.
The results also address the capital structure puzzle (i.e, what determines the choice of
financing instruments?). The opportunity to exploit asymmetric learning makes external
capital more costly to firms than internal capital. In general, internal finance should be
preferred to external. In many instances, however, external capital is subsidized, such as
through tax code provisions for limited partnerships, interest payment deductibility, and
loan guarantees. When subsidies are substantial, there may be a preference for external
finance, if asymmetric information costs are not too severe. However, when information
that emerges during the life of the project is especially valuable, and one party has better
access to that information than the other, internal financing may predominate, despite
subsidies to external capital. This notion is consistent with the observation that most
high-tech start-ups are financed with venture (equity) capital, while limited partnerships
are often used for more predictable, less volatile development projects, or natural resource
exploration projects sponsored by established firms.as
6. Conclusion
Some answers to the questions motivating this paper have now been suggested. Asym-
metric learning in a sequential decision problem may substantially reduce the benefits
of incremental decisionmaking. We have derived an optimal sequential decision contract
which demonstrates the nature of the resulting inefficiencies. However, the rather stark
conflict of interest which can be so costly also leads to simple and realistic contract terms.
The emphasis on the value of sequential decision-making in the existing literature is ex-
aggerated if asymmetric access to information is present, because much of the insider
information made available by sequential decision-making is not used efficiently in optimal
project management.
In a more general model, in which other elements of project design can be specified in
the contract, information asymmetries are likely to also affect project management. For
as Another, related argument is that the reputation which established firms can dernonstrate helps over-
come agency costs; start-up ventures have more limited access to reputation.
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instance, in an R&D or oil exploration project, the number of tests to run in a given
period may be chosen differently with information asymmetries. The differences between
fixed-sample-size and sequential strategies is examined in Morgan and Manning [1985].
Perhaps the two most important problems absent from the analysis are the two which
have been most studied in the literature: hidden effort and ez ante hidden information.30
Some advances into the area of dynamic contracting have been made for these problems,
especially the former.4 0
This paper has presented a model of optimal stopping when there are conflicting inter-
ests in the outcome of the optimal stopping problem. Agency costs have been ignored in
the economic literature\on sequential decision-making. Many economic problems, including
bankruptcy and patent or R&D policy, contain elements of an optimal stopping problem."
The results and approach of this paper can be profitably applied to such problems.
" Often referred to as "moral hasard" and "adverse selection." Arrow's [1985] "hidden" terminology is
more expressive, general, and accurate.
40 See, e.g., Laffont and Tirole [1985], Holmstrom and Milgrom [1985], Baron and Besanko [1984], Tirole
(1985], Myerson [1985], and Allen [1985].
* See, for yet another example, Bollier (1985], who considers the problem of optimal default by third-




Proof of Proposition 7(B). Under the first-best, the cutoff is Sf 3 = 0; S* > 0 strictly
because the investor gets a return on I only through Sz = P21.
At ti, the agent continues the project if
J S2f (S2 I S1 )dS2 - 6s2* 1 - F(s; IS1) > -P° (A1.1)
s;
Therefore, equation (A1.1) is satisfied with equality at Si = S*. However, the principal's
problem is to choose Si to maximize
P°?+6 L {-P°' -1+ 6 2*1-F(S2|S1)] }f(S1)dSi/Si
with the necessary condition that
-PP+6S4*1- F(Si |IS*)] =I1 (A1.2)
The first-best decision at ti is to continue if 6 E [S2 | S] > I1, so the cutoff S1PB is the
solution to
6 S2 f(S 2 I S1 B)dS2 -It = 0
0
or, substituting from (A1.2),
6 S2f(S2 I Sir3 )dS 2 -6S2* 1 - F(s; S1) + P1 = 0 (A1.3)
Comparison of (A1.2) evaluated at Si = Sj1 with (A1.3), applying FSD, establishes that
Si > SF B.J
Proof of Proposition 8. Define We = Wt ,S, E E w s].t+1($t,t, St+1)| St)
(Recall that this convention was used in the two decision problem.) Starting with the last
period, WT = f ST+1f(ST+1 I Si')dSr+1, so WT [ST,I$T,$-T] is increasing in Sr by
FSD. Implementability of DT(ST, $-.) requires
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'PT [DT(ST, ST), St, &T] + 6DT(ST ,S-T) WT (ST, ST, S-T)
> -PT [DT(S',&LZ), S;, S-_r]+ 6DT(S' ASTW( SS )T, T 4 ST)
-PT [DT(S., S..T), St, S..T] + CDT(ST, ST) WT(ST, T S-T)
> -PTr[DT(ST, L ),ST , ST] + 6DT(ST! STWT,S , S-.T)
for almost all ST, ST4 and almost all L-T such that DTjST = 1, for j = 1, ... , T - 1.
Adding yields
DT(ST, S-.T) [WT(ST,ST,ALT) - WT(S"T STS&T)]
(A1.4)
Since WT is increasing in ST, implementability requires DT(STST)nnece'igi
ST.
Now consider WT-..1:
j { -PT (DT(STi&LT),~T,LT)
f n +8 DT(ST, S T W S T9S T S I S T+) dS T1
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Dr..1(ST..., $_(T_1)) [WT-1(Sr..1,ST-1, $(T_1)) - WT..1(ST'_1,ST_1,$_ g _1,))A r A
-Dr..1(ST_1, $-(T-1)) wT-1(sT---1, -'---(-1)) - WT-1(S-1 i, S, -(Ti))] > 0
(A1.5)
which requires DT..1 nondecreasing in ST.-1. This last recursive step is perfectly general for
the T-decision problem; solving recursively by first demonstrating that Wt+1 is increasing
in Ste+, then checking the implementability conditions for Dt completes the proof.)
Proof of Proposition 9. The definition of a sufficient statistic with respect to an action
is that the joint density of S conditional on the action vector D be separable as follows:
f (St, St..*.... , Si; Dt, D-t) = rt rt (St, S..t); Dt x h(S-t; D-t)
where rt and h are nonnegative (see Holmstrom [1982]). The statistical notion is that
for any prior distribution on D, the Bayesian posterior depends on S only through the
statistic r. By Proposition 5, De is equivalent to a critical value St, such that Dt = 1 +
St > St*. Therefore, f(St,S..t;Dt,D...t) = f(St I St.1; Dt) x f(St.-i,St-2 ,.. ., S1; D-t)
by the Markovian assumption, and rt = {St, St-1} is sufficient for Dt.I
Proof of Proposition 10. Define Pt (rt) by (where S denotes {St, S-t}):
Wt (A(T)) = JrW(s)=r, Wt (P(st, S.t) [f(S, S-; Dt, Dt) / rit (St, St-l; Dt) dS
=WPM wt P ( St, S_t ) h( S-e; D...)jd S
Jr,(s)=Tt
(A1.6)
Now, Eswt (A(rt)) = Eswt(Pt(StS.t)),sowt (Es At(rt) = Eswt(Pt(St, S-t))
WT Es P(S1, S--) by Jensen's Inequality (in fact, in the present case, the weak inequality
is an equality because w is linear in P). Therefore, from this fact and (A1.6),
J ft(Tre)h(se ;D..)dS ;>J Pt(St, S-.t)h( St; D....t)dS (A 1.7 )
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By construction, the agent chooses the same action at each tine t, and receives the same
expected utility. However, the principal is weakly better off by (A1.7) .1
Proof of Proposition 11. Proceeding as before, we can implement SS (St..-1 ) if and only
if (from equation (A1.4))
[Wt S(sS -t) - w (S', St,S- - [w(st9 St, S'_..) - Wt(St', S, St > 0 (A1.8)
for almost all St,St such that DtSS_1 = Dt (S1, St _1) = 1, and almost all St _..1 such
that Dt....1 = 1, given Dt_ = 1 for all j~ = 1, ... , t - 1. As before, we can write Wt as
+ I[w+1(st+,st+1,St) - St+iGSt)] f(St+i I jd~~
where, by backwards recursion, St+.1 = St+1 is presumed. It now becomes evident that,
because of Proposition 9, Wt(St, St, St..1) reduces to Wt (St, St). Equation (A1.8) can be
rewritten as
S4(t) w+ 1(st+ 1, St+ 1) - St".+1(St)] f (St+1 I St) -if(St+i I S)J dS''+ 1
- Is41(94)St r)- S41(St)] (f(St+i I St) - f(St+1 I St)J dS,+1  0
Q artBecause W(,,) is monotonic in its first argument, we know that it is differentiable almost
everywhere. Therefore, integration by parts, with cancellation of terms which evaluate to
zero, yields
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For St > St, [F (S1+1 I St) - F (St+i | St)1 is negative by FSD. The partials in each inte-
grand are identical (by virtue of the independence of W+ 1l from &S), so implernentability
of S* 1 ( S) = S+1 (St) requires St 1 nonincreasing in St.I
Proof of Proposition 12. Available from author upon request.
Proof of Proposition 1. (Sketch) Using Proposition 12, and the necessary conditions
of the principal's optimization, we can solve for the optimal termination fee, P:
P1t= E ( '~* [P,(i - D,*]) - ID,*] + 6TtPD* |St = St] - It
r=t+1
where Dt* =DtD -1. By the agent's optimal stopping rule, P° = 0 +-+ S, = 0. Since
St = Ois absorbing, Pr{[D = 1j1St = 0 = 1 Y t < t < T, and Pr [DT=0 I St = 0]1= 1.
So
T-1
Pt= 6 S'~P,*-- It < 0 for It < 0.
r=t+1
Proof of Proposition 14. (Sketch) By the agent's optimal stopping decision, -P° =
5 E [wt+1(St+i, S*) I S*]. We can prove (see Shiryayev [1978]) that the solution w to the
agent's optimal stopping functional equation
wt+1 = max(-P°+,, 6E wt.+1(St+ 2 , St+1) I St+1]
exists, is unique, and is the least 6-excessive majorant of' the -P&+1. In particular, since
P +1 <; 0 almost everywhere (by limited liability), we know that wt+1 -P +.1 2 0 a.e.
Therefore, -PP ;> -6P4+1 -E
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Appendix 2
Comparative Statics for Numerical Erample in Section 4
For the following examples, the parameters reported in the text are used as the "base
case"; one parameter at a time is varied.
The results of varying the total undiscounted investment cost (1) are shown in Figure
2.42 For an investment only slightly larger than 60, the efficiency cost increases rapidly.
At about I = 63.5, contracting becomes infeasible altogether, and the project is never
undertaken; yet the full information present value of such a project is about 39. Thus, it
turns out that Proposition 7, which states that some socially desirable projects will not be
undertaken if financing is external, is not a close question. The cost of the agency problem
is so high that, in this example, contracting is infeasible for a project which has a full
information excess rate of return of 66%.
Agency costs increase with the investment level because the value to the investor of
abandoning the project increases. Therefore, the investor wants to increase the termination
fee; i.e, as the abandonment option value increases, offer more to the firm to encourage
the firm's interest in abandonment. However, at the same time, a larger total investment
requires a larger promised completion payment from the firm to the investor (X 2 ), to
cover both the total investment and the expected value of the termination fee (which is an
investment in incentive alignment). Since the likelihood of project completion falls as the
completion payment increases, it eventually becomes impossible to increase the expected
value of the completion payment. Hence, a contract becomes infeasible.
The pressure on the completion payment to cover both total investment and the ter-
mination fee investment is evident in Figure 3. As the investment cost increases, the
termination fee initially follows, reflecting the increasing abandonment option value. How-
ever, at about I = 61, the termination fee begins to decline again, to ease the pressure on
the completion payment X2 to cover the investment cost, I.
42 The figures below show the effects of project parameters on efficiency cost as a percentage of the
first-best project value, to remove scale effects.
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The effect of the length of the project development period is shown in Figure 4. For this
figure, we varied the final date, r2 , while holding the relative length of the first period con-
stant (r 2/ri = 2). As r 2 increases, the efficiency cost increases, because the abandonment
option becomes more valuable.
The role of project riskiness is illustrated in Figure 5, which plots the efficiency cost
against the volatility parameter, a." It is not surprising that agency costs increase rather
rapidly with riskiness. For higher a, the likelihood of completion falls, increasing the
abandonment option value to the investor. In the example shown, contracting becomes
infeasible at rather mild values for a (about 0.23); the full information value of such a
second-best infeasible project is 42.6, which provides a 72% excess economic rate of return
on investment.
Other comparative statics are presented in Figures 6-9. As the date of the second
period investment, r1, is delayed (Figure 6), agency costs fall because the abandonment
option falls as its life shortens. The effects of the risk-free interest rate, r, and the expected
growth rate in St, a, have opposite signs (Figures 7, 8). Increasing the discount rate, r,
reduces the present value of the completion payrnent, X 2 , making it more difficult to
cover the project investment and termination fee, so the parties are less able to align their
incentives through the termination fee. Increasing a has precisely the opposite effect, as
well as making it relatively more likely that S2 will be high enough for the project to be
completed.
Somewhat surprisingly, the efficiency costs fall as the fraction invested in the second
period (#) increases (Figure 9). What is happening here is that the net present value of
total investment is declining as more is delayed until r1; thus, although the abandonment
option value is increasing, the investor is able to invest substantially more in the termina-
tion fee because there is more slack in the completion payment, X 2 . This is indicated in
Figure 10, which shows the termination fee increasing as a percentage of the present value
of the r1 investment.
48 An increase in e, is equivalent to an increase in riskiness in the Rothschild-Stiglits [1970] sense. See
Merton [1973].
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